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This paper targets ‘pragmatic’ arguments for various rationality requirements on 
agents’ beliefs or preferences. An argument of this kind focuses either on the benefits 
of satisfying such requirements, or – more often – on the costs of their violation. It is 
the arguments of this second type that I am interested in. For a given requirement, an 
argument of this kind typically takes the form of a proof that whoever violates the 
requirement in question is vulnerable to exploitation: She can be taken for a ride by a 
clever bookie, even if the latter doesn’t know more than she does herself. The general 
idea of this way of approaching the costs of violations is due to Frank Ramsey:  
If anyone’s mental condition violated these laws [= the laws of probability], … [h]e could have a 
book made against him by a cunning bettor and would then stand to lose in any event. (Ramsey 
1990 (1926), p. 78) 
   Pragmatic arguments make use of different exploitation set-ups: (i) synchronic 
Dutch Books, for the violations of the standard probability axioms, (ii) diachronic 
Dutch Books, for the violations of diachronic probability principles, such as 
Reflection and Conditionalization, and (iii) Money Pumps, for the violations of the 
acyclicity requirement on preferences. 
   When we examine these various examples, one thing stands out: The different 
exploitation set-ups are based on the same underlying assumption. Thus, consider an 
agent who is logically and mathematically competent, but violates a given rationality 
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requirement. (This presupposes that the requirement itself is not a purely logical or 
mathematical demand.) Also, suppose she prefers to be better off rather than worse 
off and acts accordingly. Then, as we shall see, even if such an agent violates the 
rationality requirement under consideration, she cannot be exploited if she makes her 
decisions in a unified fashion. To be exploited she has to be disunified  in her 
decision-making, i.e., to make decisions on various issues she faces one by one, 
instead of addressing them together. A disunified agent decides on each component in 
a package separately, rather than jointly. The different exploitation set-ups are all 
based on the assumption of disunification. 
   An agent can be disunified synchronically or diachronically. In the synchronic case, 
there is a time when she is presented with several opportunities, each of which she can 
accept or reject. If she is disunified, she deals with each opportunity separately and on 
its own merits. A unified decision-maker would in sucha case instead make a single 
choice of a particular configuration of the opportunities. In the diachronic case, 
different opportunities are offered at different times. Suppose the schedule of offers is 
known beforehand by the agent.
 
She is diachronically disunified if she defers her 
decisions concerning later offers to the times at which the offers will be made and 
need to be responded to. A unified approach would again involve a single choice of a 
particular configuration of opportunities, present and future.
 1
 It would thus amount to 
a choice of a particular branch in the agent’s decision tree – a branch that extends 
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 For an extended argument in favor of unified decision making as a shield against exploitation, see 
McClennen (1990), who discusses diachronic unification under the label of “resolute choice”. More 
precisely, resolute choice appears to be a somewhat restricted and possibly more realistic form of 
diachronic unification. A resolute agent does not make an irrevocable choice of a particular 
configuration of present and future opportunities. Instead, she forms a plan as to what to choose at 
different future occasions. Embarking upon such a plan of action is a factor that significantly modifies 
the context of her future decisions, but there’s still a possibility for a resolute agent to deviate from 
what she has planned to do. However, being resolute, she does not deviate. Why she doesn’t do it even 
in those cases in which she might be expected to prefer to do so is another matter. It might be because 
her previously adopted plan modifies her preferences at later occasions so as to put them in line with 
the plan adopted, but it might also be because her commitment to follow the plan takes precedence over 
her preferences. For his own part, McClennen favours the second avenue, if I understand him correctly, 
but he rejects the suggestion that the mere adoption of a plan by the agent’s earlier self obligates her 
later selves to compliance (cf. ibid., fn 12 to chapter 9, p. 285). Instead, he favours the interpretation of 
resolute choice on which compliance is justified by the plan being a reasonable compromise between 
the preferences of the agent’s earlier and later selves – a compromise from which all selves involved in 
the implementation of the plan can profit (cf. ibid., section 12.6.).   
   For a broader picture of the various aspects of planning and diachronic self-governance, see Bratman 
(1987), (2007), (2012). 
from the root of the tree to its very top.
2
 A disunified agent, by contrast, would instead 
make separate choices at each node of the tree, with each choice concerning only the 
immediate move at the node in question.
 (As we shall see, this doesn’t presuppose 
myopia. A disunified agent’s choice of a move at hand might well take into 
consideration the predictions she makes about her future moves.) 
   Unification in decision making requires consideration of complex choice 
alternatives. For various reasons, we might often find it easier to deal with different 
issues one by one, rather than in a wholesale manner. Furthermore, in diachronic 
cases, pre-commitments might be difficult or even impossible: An agent’s self-control 
might not reach far enough into the future. All this imposes significant practical 
limitations on unified decision making. 
   Since the exploitation set-ups only work for disunified agents, pragmatic arguments 
for various constraints on beliefs and preferences only support conditional 
recommendations: “You should satisfy this constraint if you are going to make your 
decisions in a disunified manner.” In other words, pragmatic arguments identify 
constraints that function as safeguards of a disunified mind – that decrease the costs of 
disunity in decision-making. Obeying such constraints shields the disunified agent 
from potential exploitation.  
   I am not going to provide a conclusive defense of this interpretation of pragmatic 
arguments. I will, however, support it by several examples that illustrate the intimate 
connection between exploitability and disunification.  
   I will also argue against a popular view that diachronic exploitation set-ups can be 
avoided by disunified agents who have foresight. On the view I am going to criticize, 
disunified agents are not vulnerable to exploitation if they know what’s kept in store 
for them, i.e., if they know, beforehand, the schedule of offers they are going to 
receive. I will show that foresight is not enough. 
   Note that on the view I defend diachronic pragmatic arguments are more compelling 
than synchronic ones. The reason is that unified decision making is much more 
difficult to manage diachronically than synchronically. Consequently, there are 
                                                 
2
 The choice of a branch in a decision tree amounts to a choice of a specific plan of action. If a unified 
agent envisages a possibility that she might at some point deviate from the chosen plan, she is well-
advised to do more than just form a plan. She might instead choose a strategy: an assignment of moves 
to each node in the decision tree. As is easily seen, a strategy determines a plan of action (= a sequence 
of consecutive moves in which every step follows the strategy), but it does more than this: It specifies 
the moves to be made even at the nodes that are unreachable if one follows the strategy at the earlier 
nodes.  
stronger reasons for an agent to satisfy the constraints that would decrease the costs of 
diachronic disunification.  
   Isaac Levi (2002) has a very different view of the status of pragmatic arguments. 
According to him, only synchronic arguments have a good claim to validity. In his 
(2006), he modifies this view and takes a position that seems to deny validity to all 
pragmatic arguments, whether diachronic or synchronic. Before I explain why he 
takes these views and why I think he is mistaken, I need to present some examples of 
the arguments of both kinds, in order to provide the background. 
1. A synchronic Dutch-book argument for probability laws 
In this argument, it is assumed that an agent’s probability assignments – her degrees 
of belief - are her guides to action. As such, they are embodied in her betting 
dispositions, or betting commitments.
3
 More precisely, the agent’s probabilities are 
given by her betting rates. 
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 This idea, which was most famously defended by Ramsey and de Finetti, can be traced at least as far 
back as to Kant’s “Transzendentale Methodenlehre”,  towards the end of the Kritik der Reinen 
Vernunft. On Kant’s view, the strength of belief can be measured by the agent’s willingness to bet. An 
agent who is willing to bet a ducat on a proposition might balk at betting ten ducats, not to speak of 
betting “the happiness of the whole life”:   
Der gewöhnliche Probirstein: ob etwas bloße Überredung, oder wenigstens subjective Überzeugung, d.i. 
festes Glauben sei, was jemand behauptet, ist das Wetten. Öfters spricht jemand seine Sätze mit so 
zuversichtlichem und unlenkbarem Trotze aus, daß er alle Besorgnis des Irrtums gänzlich abgelegt zu 
haben scheint. Eine Wette macht ihn stutzig. Bisweilen zeigt sich, daß er zwar Überredung genug, die auf 
einen Dukaten an Wert geschätzt werden kann, aber nicht auf zehn, besitze. Denn den ersten wagt er noch 
wohl, aber bei zehnen wird er allererst inne, was er vorher nicht bemerkte, daß es nämlich doch wohl 
möglich sei, er habe sich geirrt. Wenn man sich in Gedanken vorstellt, man solle worauf das Glück des 
ganzen Lebens verwetten, so schwindet unser triumphierendes Urteil gar sehr, wir werden überaus 
schüchtern und entdecken so allererst, daß unser Glaube so weit nicht zulange. So hat der pragmatische 
Glaube nur einen Grad, der nach Verschiedenheit des Interesse, das dabei im Spiele ist, groß oder auch 
klein sein kann. (A824-5, B852-3).  
A reference to this passage has recently been made by Chignell (2007), p. 333, and Blamey (2011), pp. 
79 and 189. For a short discussion of Kant’s use of betting as a touchstone (“Probirstein”) of the 
strength of belief, and in particular of the difference between his betting arrangement and the kind of 
arrangement presented in what follows, see Eriksson & Rabinowicz (2012). In that paper, we suggest 
that Kant probably considers bets at even odds, in which one wagers a monetary amount against an 
equal monetary amount wagered by one’s opponent. The agent’s willingness to bet decreases when the 
monetary amount increases because of the diminishing marginal uility of money: as more money is 
being wagered, the potential win is worth less and less in utility terms as compared with the potential 
loss. In this respect, Kant’s betting arrangement sharply differs from the modern set-up which I 
describe below. In the latter, one implicitly assumes that utility is linear with money, i.e. that the 
marginal utility of money is constant. 
   As a curiosity, it might be mentioned that Kant declared himself prepared to bet all his possessions on 
the proposition that  at least some of the (other) planets we see are inhabited (provided such a bet could 
be empirically resolved): 
Wenn es möglich wäre durch irgendeine Erfahrung auszumachen, so möchte ich wohl alles das Meinige 
darauf verwetten, daß es wenigstens in irgendeinem von den Planeten, die wir sehen, Einwohner gebe. 
Daher sage ich, ist es nicht bloß Meinung, sondern ein starker Glaube (auf dessen Richtigkeit ich schon 
viele Vorteile des Lebens wagen würde), daß es auch Bewohner anderer Welten gebe. (A825, B853) 
   To see what this means, consider a bet on a proposition A. Assume that the bet costs 
C and pays S if won, where S and C – the price and the stake of the bet, respectively –
are monetary amounts.
4
 A bet is fair for an agent if the latter is prepared to take each 
of its sides: either to buy it or to sell it. Assume that some bets on A indeed are fair for 
a given agent (which isn’t obvious) and, furthermore, that they all exhibit the same 
ratio between their prices and stakes: If the price increases, the stake must increase in 
the same proportion for the bet to remain fair. The constant price-stake ratio for fair 
bets on A is the agent’s betting rate for A.  
   The assumption that bets remain fair under proportional increases of prices and 
stakes is certainly problematic as a general claim, but it is arguably reasonably 
realistic within a limited range in which the monetary amounts S and C are not too 
high and not too low. The explanation is that, within this range, utility is linear with 
money, which means that proportions between losses and gains in money tend to be 
equal to proportions between corresponding losses and gains in utility. 
   On the betting interpretation, the agent’s probability for A, P(A), is identified with 
her betting rate for A. The higher the price the agent is willing to pay for a bet on A 
with a given stake (or the higher the price she demands for selling such a bet), the 
higher is her probability for A.
5
 
   Note that, on this interpretation of probabilities as betting rates, the expected 
monetary value of buying a fair bet on A with price C and stake S is zero: 
[P(A)  S] - C = [C/S  S] - C = 0. 
Similarly, selling such a bet has the expected value zero: 
C - [P(A)  S] = C - [C/S  S] = 0.  
This might be thought to explain why the agent is equally willing to buy a fair bet as 
to sell it. On the assumption that, for moderate monetary amounts, utility is linear 
with money, such an explanation is reasonable for agents who are expected-utility 
maximizers. But in the present context, in which we consider agents who violate 
                                                 
4
 Betting terminology varies. Sometimes, the term “stake” refers to what the agent stakes or wagers and 
what she would lose if she lost the bet.. While in the usage I favour a stake instead is what is “at 
stake”–  it is the amount of money that can be won. 
5
 Cf. de Finetti (1990), p. 75: “The probability P(E) that You attribute to an event E is therefore the 
certain gain p which You judge equivalent to a unit gain conditional on the occurrence of E: in order to 
express it in a dimensionally correct way, it is preferable to take pS equivalent to S conditional on E, 
where S is any amount whatsoever, one Lira or one million, $20 or £75.” 
   In other words, if P(E) – the subjective probability you attribute to E – equals p, then pS is your fair 
price for a bet on E with a stake S: You judge it “equivalent to S conditional on E”. Note that if we let 
C = pS and if we assume that S > 0, then it immediately follows that p = C/S. 
various rationality constraints, an explanation on the expected-utility lines might be 
unavailable. If an agent violates some of the basic assumptions of the expected-utility 
theory (such as the standard probability axioms), then we cannot explain her 
behaviour by an appeal to expected-utility considerations. The identification of the 
agent’s probabilities with her betting rates is therefore something of a problem in the 
context of rationality violations. This somewhat undermines the pragmatic arguments 
that focus on the violations of various synchronic or diachronic probability laws, since 
such arguments presuppose that probabilities are cashed out as betting rates.
6
 I shall, 
however, disregard this issue in what follows. 
   There is one thing we should note before we continue. An adherent of the betting 
interpretation takes probabilities, i.e., degrees of belief, to be betting rates. Does this 
mean that he also takes beliefs to be betting dispositions? Not necessarily. For the 
pragmatic arguments to work, it is not necessary to assume that an agent’s beliefs are 
identical with her betting dispositions (or betting commitments). What one needs to 
assume is only that the latter are in line with the former, i.e., that the agent is disposed 
(or committed) to bet in accordance with her beliefs. This is enough to guarantee that 
degrees of belief will at the same time be measures of the agent’s dispositions (or 
commitments) to bet. 
   Let us move on. A Dutch book is a system of bets on various propositions which is 
such that, if an agent accepts all those bets, she must suffer a loss come what may, 
i.e., whatever turns out to be the case. A Dutch book is synchronic or diachronic 
depending on whether the bets in the book are offered at the same time or at different 
occasions.  
   If probabilities are betting rates, then the agent who violates the standard probability 
laws is vulnerable to a synchronic Dutch book. This provides a pragmatic argument 
for obeying the laws in question.
7
 
   As an example, consider the addition axiom for probabilities, 
P(A  B) = P(A) + P(B), if A is logically incompatible with B. 
                                                 
6
 The identification of probabilities with betting rates is problematic in other contexts as well (cf. 
Eriksson and Rabinowicz 2012). But it creates special problems in the present context. 
7
 Actually, this argument also has a positive part: It can be shown that an agent whose betting rates 
satisfy the standard probability axioms is not vulnerable to a Dutch book. (More precisely, she is 
invulnerable to synchronic Dutch books; to avoid diachronic ones she must also satisfy such principles 
as Reflection and Conditionalization.) In what follows, however, I focus on the negative part of the 
argument. 
Suppose your probability assignments P violate this axiom. For example, suppose that 
for some logically incompatible A and B, P(A  B) < P(A) + P(B). In such a case, I 
can offer you a bet on A and another bet on B, each with the same stake S > 0, and 
with prices P(A)S and P(B)S, respectively. At the same time I can ask you to sell a bet 
on A  B, again with the same stake S and a price P(A  B)S. Given your 
probabilities, all these bets are fair. Their price-stake ratios equal your probabilities 
for the propositions on which the bets are to be made: P(A), P(B) and P(A  B), 
respectively.
 
But if you accept the three bet offers, you are bound to make a net loss. 
Your loss will be P(A)S + P(B)S - P(A  B)S, which is the price difference between 
what you need to pay for the first two bets and what you receive for the bet you sell. 
Since P(A  B) < P(A) + P(B), you need to pay more than you receive. As for the 
stakes, if either A or B turns out to be the case, you are going to win one of the bets 
you have bought (just one, since A and B are incompatible), but lose the one you have 
sold. Thus, you will receive S, but at the same time you will have to pay back the 
same amount. If neither A nor B turns out to be the case, no bets will be won by either 
party. Thus, no stake payments will be made. This means that, whatever happens, you 
net loss will equal (P(A) + P(B) - P(A  B))S. 8 
   As an aside, an important limitation of this argument needs to be mentioned at this 
point. Even a fully rational agent can be exploited by parties who know more than the 
she does. There is nothing strange in this: knowledge is power. In pragmatic 
arguments, if such arguments are to have any bite, it is therefore essential that the 
exploiter doesn’t know more than the agent herself. But since the exploiter needs to 
know the agent’s probability assignments in order to set up a Dutch book, it follows 
that the agent must be assumed to know her probability assignments as well. Needless 
to say, this assumption of self-knowledge on the part of the agent might well be 
questioned: knowing the strength of one’s beliefs is not atrivial matter.9 In what 
follows, however, I am going to disregard this problem. 
                                                 
8
 If the sum of the agent’s probabilities for A and B instead is lower than her probability for the 
disjunction A  B, then the exploitation set-up is reversed: the agent is asked to sell the bets on A and 
on B and to buy the bet on A  B. No exploitation scheme is available only if P(A  B) = P(A) + P(B), 
as required by the addition axiom. 
9
 This point, as we have seen, was already made by Kant. 
   What I instead want to focus on is another limitation of the argument: the role 
played by disunification. A violator of the addition axiom is being exploited in this 
set-up because her decision-making is disunified: She decides on each bet separately, 
rather than jointly. If she did the latter, then – assuming she is logically and 
mathematically competent – she would certainly not choose to accept the whole bet 
package: She would recognize that at least one combination of actions – refusing all 
the bets – would be better for her whatever happens. In this unified mode, she might 
however still decide to accept one or two bet offers, say, to sell the bet on the 
disjunction A  B but refuse to buy the bets on A and on B. Obviously, this would not 
give her a guaranteed loss. 
   At one point, Skyrms (1980) went further than this and suggested that an agent who 
is vulnerable to a synchronic Dutch book must be logically confused (and not just 
disunified in her decisions). Such an agent evaluates one and the same betting 
arrangement differently depending on the way it is presented to her: as a collection of 
three fair bets, or as one composite opportunity that would give her a loss whatever 
happens. It is only if viewed in the latter way that she evaluates the arrangement as 
bad. However, this suggestion of logical confusion is unconvincing. Admittedly, the 
agent we consider does not view any of the bets in the package as unattractive, but she 
might well assign a negative value to the bet package as a whole. What this means, 
howevr, is only that her evaluations aren’t additive: The value she ascribes to the 
whole differs from the sum of the values she ascribes to its parts. Non-additivity in 
evaluation  need not be questionable as such and it certainly doesn’t presuppose a 
logical mistake of any sort (cf. Schick 1986). That instrumental value need not be 
additive is obvious; in economics this feature is referred to as complementarity. A 
knife is more useful than a fork, but a knife and a fork together are more useful than 
two knives. That final value (value in itself, for its own sake) need not be additive 
either is less obvious but its non-additivity has been recognized by a fair number of 
philosophers starting at least with G. E. Moore (1903). The latter referred to this 
phenomenon as “the principle of organic unities.” Admittedly, the ‘expectational’ 
value possessed by bets is not final and it does not seem to be instrumental either, at 
least not in the literal sense, but it is by no means obvious that such value must satisfy 
additivity. 
   We need to say something about the case in which the agent violates the probability 
axiom that requires logical truths to be assigned probability one. If her probability for 
a logical truth A is higher than one, she is willing to buy a bet on A for a price that is 
higher than the stake to be won. If it is lower than one, she is willing to sell a bet on A 
for a price that is lower than the stake she is guaranteed to lose. Thus, in each case, 
she is exploitable. Since this exploitation set-up consists of just one bet, it does not, in 
order to work, require the agent to be disunified in her decision making. But it only 
works if the agent is logically confused (does not recognize that A is logical truth) or 
if she doesn’t mind making losses. This means that the case under consideration is 
consistent with the claim we are defending: Disunification is a necessary pre-
condition of exploitability for a logically and mathematically competent agent, who 
prefers to be better off than worse off. 
2. A diachronic Dutch-book argument for Reflection 
The Principle of Reflection stipulates that one’s current conditional probabilities 
should reflect one’s hypothetical future probabilities. More precisely, letting P be the 
agent’s probability at time t, and P’ her probability at t’  t, 
Reflection: P(A/P’(A)  k)  k, provided that P(P’(A)  k) > 0. 
The analogous condition applies if we replace all the occurrences of  by , or by =, 
in the principle above. 
   The intuitive plausibility of Reflection as a general constraint might well be 
questioned: Just think of cases in which we have good grounds to expect a 
degeneration of our epistemic capacities that will unduly draw down (or draw up) our 
future probabilities for A. In such cases, obeying Reflection seems clearly unjustified. 
Nevertheless, as has been shown by van Fraassen (1984), an agent whose probability 
assignments violate Reflection, for whatever reason, is vulnerable to a diachronic 
Dutch Book. Instead of presenting his proof in full generality, let us consider an 
example, due to Christensen (1991), which illustrates this point. Suppose an agent’s 
probability assignment P at t fails to reflect her hypothetical probabilities P´at t’: At t, 
she suspects that at t’ her probability estimate of A will be too low. In particular, 
therefore, 
(i) P(A/P’(A)  ½) = 3/4. 
Letting E stand for P’(A)  ½, suppose that  
(ii) P(E) = 1/5. 
At t, a bookie offers the agent two bets: 
(1) a bet on E, with price 1 and stake 5; 
(2) a bet on A conditional on E, with price 15 and stake 20.  
In a conditional bet, if the condition turns out to be false, the bet is called off and its 
purchase is refunded. On the betting interpretation, conditional probabilities equal 
betting rates for conditional bets. Therefore, given our assumptions about the agent’s 
probabilities, it is easy to see that bets 1 and 2 are fair: their price-stake ratios are 1/5 
and 3/4, respectively.  
   Then, at t’, if E turns out to be true, but not otherwise, the bookmaker offers to buy 
from the agent a third bet: 
(3) a bet on A, with price 10 and stake 20. 
If E is true, then at t’ the agent should be willing to sell this bet. We know that, if E is 
true, the agent’s probability for A at t’ will not exceed ½. 
   If the agent accepts all the bet offers (including the third one, if that offer is made as 
well), she will lose 1 unit whatever happens. If E is false, she will lose 1 unit on her 
bet on E, while the conditional bet on A given E will be called off and no bet offer 
will be made at t’. If E is true, she will win the bet on E and her conditional bet on A 
will be on. But then, at t’, the bookie will buy back this bet on A at a lower price (bet 
3). Since the price difference (15 – 10 = 5) exceeds by 1 unit her net gain from the bet 
on E (5 – 1 = 4), the agent will again suffer a total loss. 
   There is an obvious objection to this line of reasoning. A pragmatic argument for a 
rationality constraint is supposed to demonstrate that a violation of this constraint 
would lead to a guaranteed loss by the violator’s own lights. To be effective, such an 
argument should therefore be based on the assumption that the agent to be exploited 
knows at least as much as her would-be exploiter. We have already pointed this out 
before. But then, in the diachronic case, the agent must know, beforehand, the what 
bets are kept in store for her. Which means she must know that she is being taken for 
a ride. In other words, in the case of diachronic set-ups, the agent must have foresight. 
But, the objection continues, an agent with foresight will surely upset the bookie’s 
evil design by simply refusing to accept the earlier bets in the book. Thereby, the 
whole book will crumble: By refusing bets at t, the agent prevents the bet offer at t’ – 
an offer which, if it were made (i.e. if E would turn out to be the case), she would be 
willing to accept, but the prospect of which she now, at t, finds unattractive.
10
 (For 
this line of reasoning, cf. Levi 1988, and Maher 1992.)  
   Skyrms (1993) shows how this objection can be disarmed.
11
 Suppose the bookie is 
persistent. Persistency means that the later bet offers in the exploitation scheme are 
not conditioned on the acceptance of the earlier ones. Thus, assuming that the agent 
knows the set-up, including the persistency of the bookie, she knows that the latter is 
bound to offer to buy bet 3 at t’ if E will turn out to be the case – that he will do it 
even if the agent at t were to refuse the bets offered at that time. Suppose also that the 
bookie makes all the three bets ‘more than fair’: For each bet she accepts, the agent 
will get a small reward . Still, the reward is so small that 3 < 1. Then, even with the 
extra rewards, the agent will suffer a total loss if she accepts every bet offer. She will 
lose 1 - 3 if E is true and 1 - 2 if E is false. 
   For the agent to conclude that she has no reason to abstain from the bets offered at t, 
it is enough if (i) she believes her actions at t won’t influence the potential bet offer at 
t’ (which follows if the bookie is known to be persistent), and (ii) she expects to deal 
with the offer at t’ in the same way independently of what she might do at t. As (i) and 
(ii) imply that her present actions won’t influence her opportunities and behavior in 
the future, she will conclude for each of the two bets offered at t that buying this bet is 
preferable to abstaining, as it improves her prospects by  independently of what she 
is going to do at t’. If she is synchronically, but not diachronically unified, she will 
consider the two bets offered at t jointly instead of separately, but still conclude that 
buying both of them is preferable since it improves he prospects by 2 in comparison 
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 In terms of the agent’s prior probabilities (at t), the prospect of selling bet 3 at t’ has a negative 
expected monetary value: P(E)(Cbet 3 - (P(A/E)  Sbet 3))  =  1/5(10 – (¾  20))  =  -1. 
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 Actually, in that paper Skyrms does not explicitly discuss violations of the Principle of Reflection. 
Instead, he focuses on an analogous objection to a diachronic Dutch book against an agent whose 
updating strategy violates the rule of Conditioning. This means that for some potential evidence E and 
some proposition A, the agent’s strategy requires her to update her probability for A upon learning E to 
PE(A), where PE(A)  P(A/E). Still, Skyrms’s idea can be used just as well to deal with the objection at 
hand. 
with buying none and by  in comparison with buying just one, whatever she is going 
to do at t´.
12
  
   The key to this diagnosis is that, in the envisaged set-up, the agent cannot prevent 
the later offer of a bet by refusing the earlier bets. And if the offer will be made, it 
will be attractive in terms of the agent’s probabilities at that future time. Under these 
circumstances accepting the current bet offers is preferable, since it diminishes the 
agent’s expected loss. As Skyrms puts it: 
Why is it assumed [by Maher and Levi] that the cunning bettor will just go home if [the agent] 
refuses to bet today? […] Even though [the agent] will see it coming, she will prefer the sure 
loss […] because doing so looks strictly better to her than the alternative. (Skyrms 1993, pp. 
323f)  
And he concludes: “‘Seeing it coming’ does not help.” (ibid., p. 326) 
   What would help, then? A salient feature of this case is the agent’s disunification 
over time. The violator of Reflection is exploited because she decides on different 
bets at the times they are being offered, instead of making one decision on all the 
three bets together. If she did the latter, then – assuming she is logically and 
mathematically competent and prefers to be better off rather than worse off – she 
would certainly not choose to accept the whole bet package, since a simple calculation 
would show that refusing the three bets would be better for her whatever happens.
13
 
3. Money Pumps against agents with cyclical preferences 
Suppose an agent’s preferences (represented by ≺) over alternative outcomes x, y, and 
z are cyclic:  
x ≺ y ≺ z ≺ x. 
Let x be the status quo alternative. The agent is offered y in exchange for x, provided 
she pays  > 0 for the exchange, where that payment is too small to reverse her 
preferences over outcomes. After this trade, she is offered to trade y for z, if she pays 
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 This reasoning appeals to (statewise) dominance. An action A is preferable to an action B, if A would 
lead to a better result than B in every state, i.e. whatever happens. 
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 Unification is not the only thing that would help in the present case. A disunified agent who violates 
Reflection could avoid exploitation if, contrary to what we have assumed, her earlier choices had an 
appropriate causal influence on her later behaviour. For example, she wouldn’t be vulnerable to 
exploitation if her acceptance of the earlier bets would cause her to reject the bet offered at the later 
stage. But it’s not safe to rely on causal connections between choices: They could just as well work to 
the agent’s disadvantage: Acceptance of the earlier bets could cause the agent to accept the later bet as 
well. Unification in decision making is clearly superior to causation in this respect. (Similar remarks 
apply, mutatis mutandis, to agents with cyclic preferences that we are going to discuss in the next 
section.) 
an additional . If she accepts, she is then offered to trade z for x, provided she again 
pays . After the three exchanges, the agent is back to where she started, minus 3. 
She has been used as a money pump. (Cf. Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes 1955, and 
Raiffa 1968). 
   For this pump to work, the extra payment of  should not reverse the agent’s 
preferences at any stage, at least up to 3. Thus, we need to assume that 
x ≺ y -  ≺ z - 2 ≺ x - 3. 
   The money-pump argument, as described above, invited an obvious objection: For 
the pump to work, the agent mustn’t know she is being taken for a ride. Otherwise, if 
she knew that further trades are being kept in store for her, she would refuse to trade 
(cf. Schick 1986, and Schwartz 1986). The objection is that the condition of foresight, 
which should be satisfied in diachronic pragmatic arguments, is not satisfied in the 
money pump in its traditional version. A prudent agent with foresight would avoid to 
be pumped, because she would see what’s coming. (If, after having read the preceding 
section, you already see that this objection can be dealt with, please be patient with 
with my discussion of this case. The two cases are similar, but they are not fully 
analogous.) 
   The idea of foresight coupled with prudence as a shield against exploitation can be 
made more precise in terms of backward-induction reasoning. When an agent 
confronts a sequential choice problem and has a robust trust in her future practical 
rationality, with the latter being interpreted as itself being a robust feature of the agent 
– a feature she would exhibit at any future moment of choice, independently of her 
past performance – she can solve the problem she faces by reasoning backwards, so to 
speak. She can first determine what move it would be rational for her to make at the 
last choice node at each branch of her decision tree, where it is clear what payoff her 
move would result in. Relying on her future robust rationality, she can predict she 
would make that move were she to reach the node in question. Taking her trust in her 
future rationality also to be robust, she expects to hold on to these predictions upon 
reaching the next-to-last choice node on each branch. This allows her to determine 
what move would be rational at each such penultimate node and thus, again relying on 
her future robust rationality, to predict her own behavior at that node. Continuing in 
this way, from the end-points of the tree to its beginning, such a sophisticated chooser 
finds out what moves are rational at each choice node of the tree. To put it shortly: At 
each choice node, the backward-induction move is the one that would be optimal on 
the assumption that any move made at that node would be followed by the backward-
induction moves at all the later choice nodes. (Note, though, that this simple 
formulation ignores the possibility of ties. With potential ties, the definition of 
backward induction is more complicated.) 
   Backward-induction reasoning is readily applicable to money-pump problems. As 
was argued by McClennen (1990, section 10.2), a sophisticated chooser – i.e., a 
disunified but farsighted agent, who puts her foresight to use in backward induction 
reasoning – will avoid being pumped. I argued for the same claim myself in 
Rabinowicz (1995). Since McClennen’s original argument was slightly flawed, the 
presentation below follows my 1995 paper.  
   We consider the agent’s sequential choice problem that consists of three trade offers 
in a row: 
Figure 1: Money Pump 
 
The forks in this decision tree are the agent’s choice nodes. Going up means trading, 
going down is refusing to trade. The final outcomes are specified at the end-points of 
each branch in the tree. The bold lines represent backward-induction moves. At the 
third node, the agent’s preferences dictate trading (i.e. going up), since she prefers x - 
3 to z - 2. Given that she expects to trade at the third node if she were to reach that 
far, her choice at the second choice node should be to refuse to trade (i.e. to go down): 
This gives her y - , which she prefers to x - 3. But then, given that she expects to 
refuse at the second node, her choice at the first node should be to trade, since she 
prefers y -  to x. Thus, the sophisticated chooser will make one exchange but then 
move no further. Even though her preferences are cyclical, she will not be pumped.  
   Are we then out of the woods? Is foresight coupled with prudence sufficient to stop 
the pump? Not quite. What follows is a description of a money pump that can be used 
against a sophisticated chooser (cf. Rabinowicz 2000). 
   In the money pumps discussed up to now, the series of trades terminates as soon as 
the agent refuses to make yet another exchange. No further trade offers are 
forthcoming. Suppose we change this feature of the decision problem and assume the 
exploiter to be persistent: If the agent refuses to trade, the exploiter comes back with 
the same trade offer at the next stage.
14
 There are three stages at which offers are 
made. The decision tree for this new money pump looks as follows: 
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 Obviously, it is a variant of the same idea that was exploited by Skyrms (1993) in his treatment of 
diachronic Dutch books (cf. the preceding section). 
Figure 2: Money Pump with Persistent Offers 
 
As before, trades and refusals to trade are represented as upward and downward 
moves, respectively. If the agent each time refuses to trade, she ends up with x. If she 
trades just once, at whatever stage, she ends up with y - . If she trades twice, she 
receives z - 2. Finally, if she trades three times, she receives x - 3, i.e. gets back to 
where she has started, minus extra payments. 
   The bold lines again stand for the backward-induction moves. It is easy to see that 
the following holds: 
(i) At each ultimate choice node, backward induction prescribes trading, as this gives 
the agent her preferred alternative and she knows that her choice is terminal: No 
further trade offers will be forthcoming.  
(ii) Since she predicts she will trade at each ultimate node and since she expects to 
hold on to this prediction, she should also trade at each penultimate node, for the 
following reason: For the upper penultimate node, she predicts that trading at that 
point would eventually lead to x - 3 while refusal to z - 2, which she disprefers to x - 
3. Analogously, for the lower penultimate choice node, she predicts that trading at 
that node would eventually lead to z - 2 while refusal to y - , which she disprefers to 
z - 2.  
(iii) Given that she predicts she will trade at each subsequent node, she should trade at 
the first node as well. Trading at that node would eventually lead to x - 3, while 
refusal would lead to z - 2, which she disprefers to x - 3. 
   We conclude, then, that in this modified money pump, a sophisticated chooser with 
cyclic preferences will be pumped: She will trade each time, which will get her back 
to where she started, minus extra payments. The reason this pump works is obvious. 
The exploiter, being persistent in his offers, never lets the agent off the hook. Refusal 
to trade at an early stage does not terminate the pump: The trade offer will instead be 
repeated. 
   That backward induction implies repeated trading, if the exploiter is persistent, is a 
robust result, which can be generalized to pumps with an arbitrary number of stages 
(for the proof, see Rabinowicz 2000). Such pumps may be based on any number n of 
basic cycling alternatives, x1,…, xn (in our example, n = 3), and they may involve any 
number k of full rounds (in our example, k = 1). The only extra assumption we need to 
obtain this result is that the small payment required by each trade never reverses the 
agent’s preference with regard to the basic cycling alternatives, independently of how 
many such payments she has already made. 
   There are obvious similarities between this set-up and the one considered by 
Skyrms. In both cases, the exploitation is made possible by the persistency of the 
exploiter. To be sure, this notion of persistency is cashed out in different ways in the 
two set-ups. In Skyrms’s scheme, the exploiter is persistent in the sense that his later 
bet offers are not conditioned on the agent’s acceptance of the earlier offers. In my 
scheme, the exploiter is persistent in the sense that he repeats the exchange offers that 
have been rejected by the agent. But the main idea is the same in both cases: 
Persistency is a feature that prevents the agent from getting off the hook by actions 
that would stop the ongoing exploitation scheme before it has run its full course. 
   A difference between the current set-up and the one suggested by Skyrms is that the 
Skyrmsian agent does not need to make use of backward induction. Accepting the 
earlier bets is advantageous for her whether or not she is going to accept the bet that 
will be offered at the later stage if E will turn to be the case. It is different in our 
money pump. For example, trading at the first stage is advantageous for the agent 
because she is going to trade at both stages that follow. Were she instead to trade only 
once in what follows, it would be rational for her to abstain from trading at the first 
node.  
   As is well-known, the method of backward induction is quite controversial. The 
assumptions needed for its defense, as a general method of solving extensive-form 
games and dynamic decision problems, are very strong. Too strong, many would say. 
In particular, as mentioned above, the agent is assumed to to have a robust trust in her 
own future rationality and the future rationality of her protagonists. And she must 
expect to keep this trust under all counterfactual circumstances, given all possible 
evidence about past behavior. That is, she must expect to keep it even at the choice 
nodes that can only be reached by a sequence of irrational moves, on her part or on 
the part of other players. But, intuitively speaking, at such choice nodes one would 
expect her trust in the future rationality of the players to be undermined. (Note that 
these choices might be irrational not only intuitively, but also by the standards of 
backward induction itself.) 
   However, in Rabinowicz (1998), I have shown that a defense of backward induction 
for a limited class of (what I have called) terminating games and decision problems 
can be based on much less controversial assumptions (cf. also Aumann 1998 and 
Broome &Rabinowicz 1999 for further discussion). A game or a decision problem is 
terminating, if, at each of its choice nodes, backward induction prescribes a 
terminating move, i.e. a move that is not followed by any further  moves. It can be 
shown that to obtain the backward-induction solution for games of this kind, there is 
no need for robusttrust inrationalit. It is enough to assume that each player expects to 
retain her original trust in rationality of the players as long as she lacks evidence to 
the contrary, i.e., as long as no irrational moves are made in the game.  
   Obviously, the Money Pump with Persistent Offers is not a terminating decision 
problem. However, in Rabinowicz (2001), I have shown that it is possible to set up a 
terminating decision problem – a “centipede for intransitive preferrers” – in which an 
agent with cyclic preferences will forgo sure benefits if she solves her problem using 
backward induction. (Forgoing sure benefits is just as bad, one might say, as 
accepting sure losses, which is the predicament of the exploited agent.)  
   The problem in question is just like the standard Money Pump from Figure 1, apart 
from two differences: (i) Each offer, if accepted, involves exchanging what one holds 
for a dispreferred alternative: x for z, then z for y, and finally y for x. (ii) Instead of 
having to pay for an exchange, there is a small reward each time, with the proviso, 
however, that these small rewards do not suffice to reverse the agent’ preferences. I.e., 
x ≻ z +  ≻ y + 2 ≻ x + 3. As soon as an exchange offer is rejected by the agent, no 
further exchange opportunities are forthcoming. Thus, there is no persistency in 
offers. As can easily be seen, the backward-induction solution prescribes rejecting 
exchange offers at each choice node and thereby terminating the interaction. Thus, 
using backward-induction the agent goes down in the first move, thereby forgoing a 
sure benefit: If she instead made the three exchanges, she would get back to where she 
started while gaining 3 on the way.15 
   Let us go back, however, to the main thread of our discussion. As in the set-ups in 
the two preceding sections, the agent with cyclic preferences is exploited in the 
Money Pump with Persistent Offers because her decision-making is disunified: She 
decides on each exchange separately, at the stage at which it is being offered, instead 
of making a single choice concerning all the three stages. Were she to make a single 
choice, then, we may safely assume, she would not choose to accept all the three 
exchanges: A simple calculation would show that refusing all of them would save her 
the extra costs and still result in the same outcome (x). 
   Since her preferences are cyclic, it is not determined by our description of the case 
what particular outcome the unified agent would choose in such a situation. But this 
cyclicity in her pairwise preferences does not imply that she would be unable to make 
a rational choice, when she considered all the alternatives together.  
   Here’s how one can think of this problem. Let C be a choice function that picks out 
subsets from sets of alternatives in a given domain. Intuitively, for any alternative set 
S, C(S) consists of all the alternatives in S that the agent would view as choiceworthy 
if she were confronted with S as the set of alternatives to choose from. We allow that 
C(S) might be be empty for some non-empty sets S in the domain. Pairwise preference 
can be defined in terms of C: An alternative i is (strictly) preferred to an alternative j 
if and only if C({i, j}) = {i}. Analogously, indifference (equipreference) between i 
and j means that C({i, j}) = {i, j}. If C({i, j}) is empty, there is a gap in the agent’s 
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 Yet another version of a money pump has recently been proposed by Dougherty (1913). His elegant 
explotation set-up only appeals to (statewise) dominance and does not rely on backward induction at 
all. In this respect it is like Skyrms’s construction. However, it only works against agents who have 
cyclic preferences over packages consisting of several components and in addition requires that their 
preferences over components are weakly separable. Thus, it is limited in generality. 
preference ordering as far as the comparison between i and j is concerned. Note that, 
on this approach, the notion of a choice function C is definitionally prior to the notion 
of preference. Thus, we do not assume that C(S) is definable as, say, the set of 
alternatives in S that are ‘optimal’, i.e. preferred to or equipreferred with every 
alternative in S, or, more cautiously but still contentiously, as the set of alternatives in 
S that are ‘maximal’, i.e. not dispreferred to any alternative in S. Indeed, we do not 
even require that C(S) is ‘closed upwards’, i.e., that an alternative in S that is preferred 
to some alternative in C(S) must itself belong to C(S). Admittedly, this may be viewed 
as an extremely permissive approach to choiceworthiness, but perhaps not excessively 
so. 
   Consider a set S of cycling alternatives. For any alternative j in S, S contains some i 
such that i is preferred to j. However, this is compatible with C(S) being non-empty. 
In such a case, the cycle in S can be said to be benign. If, on the other hand, C(S) is 




   In our example of the money pump, it is possible that the cycle indeed might be 
benign. But x - 3 will certainly not be among the choiceworthy alternatives, i.e., it 
will not belong to C(S), given that it is worse than x in one  respect (-3) and is just 
like x in every other respect. It might still be the case that C(S) is non-empty; for 
example, x itself might belong to C(S). But if C(S) is non-empty, it cannot be closed 
upwards. If it were, then C(S) would have to contain all the cycling alternatives, 
including x - 3,  as soon as it contains one of them. 
   The distinction between the two types of cyclicity – the benign and the vicious one 
– is important when it comes to the discussion of the rationality of cyclical 
preferences. Benign cyclicity allows for a rational choice from the cycle as a whole. 
Thus, a unified agent with benign cyclic preferences might rationally choose one of 
the choiceworthy alternatives in the cycle and head on to it. Since x - 3 is not 
choiceworthy and therefore will not be her chosen alternative, she will not be 
pumped. Things are different for a disunified agent, even if the latter is sophisticated 
enough to use backward induction in her practical reasoning. Such an agent will still 
be subject to a money pump, quite independently of whether the cycle in her 
                                                 
16
 On this issue, see Rabinowicz (2000). The present treatment slightly differs from the one in that 
paper. 
preferences is benign or vicious. And even if it is vicious, she will still act rationally 
while getting money-pumped. The reason is that at each choice node she is faced with 
a choice between two final outcomes only. She never has to choose from the whole 
cycling set of the three final outcomes. 
   I mention this possibility of benign cycles, because Levi (2006, pp. 375f) does not 
take it into consideration. There is no need, according to him, to resort to money 
pumps in criticizing cyclic preferences. What makes such preferences unacceptable in 
his view is the agent’s precarious predicament when it comes to a choice from the 
whole set of cycling alternatives: 
Cyclic preferences are irrational precisely because X [who has such preferences] cannot choose 
rationally in some decision problems. Were X confronted with a three way choice between x, y 
and z, X could not follow the policy of choosing an option that is […] optimal according to some 
permissible ranking and, indeed, could not follow the slightly different policy of choosing an 
option that is maximal in the sense that no option is strictly preferred to it. I am convinced by 
this argument that cycles should be avoided. Rabinowicz’s argument [= my money pump with 
persistent offers] seems far less compelling.
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It should be clear why I don’t think that this criticism of cyclicity is convincing. Even 
though every option in the cycling set is dispreferred to some of its competitors, it 
may be that the cycle in question is benign, i.e. that some of the options in the cycle 
are choiceworthy despite being neither optimal nor maximal. In that case, a rational 
choice from the set of cycling options is possible, contrary to what Levi suggests. 
 
4. Levi’s criticism of diachronic pragmatic arguments 
In “Money Pumps and Diachronic Dutch Books” (2002), Levi considers my money 
pump with persistent offers and Skyrms’s version of a diachronic Dutch book with a 
persistent exploiter. He argues that there is a decisive difference between these 
diachronic exploitation schemes and synchronic exploitation set-ups, such as classic 
synchronic Dutch books. The difference has to do with the range of options that are 
available to the agent. The actions of an agent who is being exploited in a synchronic 
set-up are, when taken together, (statewise) dominated by an option that stands at her 
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 Cf. also Levi (2002), p. 242: 
Let Z have strict categorical preferences for A, B, and C that yield a cycle. How should Z 
choose when all and only these three are options available to him? Maximizers of value will 
refuse to choose any option dispreferred to all other options […] By this consideration, none of 
the options may be recommended. But decision-makers who evaluate their options so that no 
option available to them is admissible are synchronically incoherent. It is a cardinal condition of 
rational choice that the set of admissible options be nonempty. One should avoid cycles in 
categorical preference to avoid violating this cardinal requirement. 
disposal. The agent accepts each bet in the book even though she could have chosen 
an option – to reject all the bets on offer – that would have led to a better outcome 
under all possible circumstances – in every possible state of the world. In a diachronic 
set-up, things are different. Thus, consider the agent X at the initial choice node. “X 
has no control then over what [she] will choose later. He can only predict what he will 
do.” (Levi 2002, p. 239) If he is exposed to the money pump with persistent offers 
and ends up making the three trades, “X is not choosing [at any point] an option 
dominated by another available as an option to him” (ibid., p. 241, Levi’s emphasis). 
In particular, at the initial choice node, refusing to trade at any of the three stages is 
not an option that stands at the agent’s disposal. Because of this absence of an 
available option that dominates the course of action actually taken, the agent cannot 
be charged with irrationality.  
   To be sure, Levi writes, a money pump with persistent offers shows that an agent 
with cyclic preferences can be ‘taxed’ for having preferences of this kind. The extra 
costs she incurs may be seen as tax payments. But vulnerability to taxation is not 
irrationality. Levi concludes:  
It may be argued that if X did not have the cyclical preferences, he could not be taxed in the 
manner just sketched. Avoiding cyclical preferences to avoid taxation is not avoiding a 
dominated option. It is adapting one’s preferences to circumstances as in the case of sour grapes.  
   Is adjusting preferences so that one may not consider oneself a victim of taxation a good idea? 
I doubt whether a general all-purpose answer can be given to this question. It is certainly not a 
requirement of minimal rationality. Why should we mandate sour grapes? […] 
   Money Pump arguments were designed initially to show that individuals who violate certain 
canons of rationality will end up choosing options that are dominated by other options available 
to them just like synchronic arguments do. Showing that violating these canons is one way, that 
in the face of other assumptions, makes one vulnerable to taxation, is no substitute. Those who 
use money pump arguments to defend acyclicity of preference have failed to show that decision-
makers who violate acyclicity are driven to choose dominated options. (ibid., pp. 241f) 
Levi’s diagnosis of Skyrms’s version of the diachronic Dutch book is exactly 
analogous. The agent lacks control over her future choices; she can only predict what 
she will do. Consequently, she cannot at t decide to refuse all the bets offers, both the 
ones made at t and the ones she might receive at t’. This means that she cannot be 
accused of acting in a way that is dominated by some option that stands at her 
disposal.  
Diachronic dutch books purport to show that the decision maker X at the initial node will be 
driven by considerations of rationality to choose an option inferior to some other option 
available to him no matter what is the case consonant with X’s initial state of full belief. 
   According to Skyrms’s scenario, X is worse off, no matter how X chooses, than X was in the 
initial status quo. If X has the option of remaining in the status quo position, X should do so 
[rather than act as she does]. But by hypothesis X does not have this option. […] Buying [the bet 
on A conditional on E] at the initial stage is not dominated by refusing to buy it at that stage. 
Since these are the only two options, where is the beef? (ibid., p. 247) 
5. My response  
Indeed, where is the beef? Levi is quite right that, both in my money pump and in 
Skyrms’s diachronic set-up, it is assumed that the agent at the initial stage cannot 
control what she will do in the future. As Skyrms puts it: “Deciding not to bet ever is 
not an option.” (Skyrms 1993, p. 323) Consequently, the agent’s course of action is 
not dominated by any of the options that stand at her disposal. It is only dominated by 
a certain sequence of options, which are available to the agent at different times. But 
the sequence as a whole is not an option for the agent, at any time.
18
 
   However, to deal with this issue, we can simply modify the diachronic set-ups so as 
to put the two kinds of arguments, the synchronic and the diachronic kind, on an equal 
footing. Let us assume, therefore, that the agent at the initial stage can decide on the 
whole temporal sequence of her actions, but, as a matter of fact, she never does and 
instead decides on different offers at the times when they are made. However, if she 
did view her decision-problem in a unified way, which she could do, her prior 
planning decision concerning the whole action sequence would determine her 
subsequent behavior. 
   In this way, the synchronic and the diachronic exploitation set-ups become 
analogous. In the synchronic case, the agent is also assumed to engage in a disunified 
decision making: She makes decisions on each bet separately. (Otherwise, as we have 
seen, no exploitation would take place.) But, if she viewed the situation in a unified 
manner, she would then make a single choice as to which bets to accept and which to 
reject. It is in this sense that she has at her disposal the option of declining all the bets, 
which dominates her actual behavior. This option is available to her, since it would 
figure in her deliberation as one of the alternatives if she were unified (which she is 
not) and nothing hinders her from viewing the decision problem in such a unified 
fashion. In this respect, then, the synchronic set-up is similar to the diachronic one, 
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 That the absence of a feasible dominating option in diachronic exploitation set-ups makes the latter 
inadequate as means to establish the irrationality of constraint violations is also emphasized by Teddy 
Seidenfeld in his writngs (cf. Seidenfeld 1988, pp. 280f). Steele (2010, p. 274) summarizes 
Seidenfeld’s position as follows: “The dominating strategy against which we measure the agent’s sure 
loss in each of the scenarios modelled above is not, in fact, a dynamically feasible option – the agent 
predicts that they would not make the requisite series of choices at the given choice nodes. The idea is 
that such infeasible options should not enter into any analysis of the decision problem and its 
solutions.” 
after we have modified the latter to make unified decision-making possible in this 
case as well. (For this suggestion, see Rabinowicz (2006).) 
   One might point out that there still is this difference between the synchronic and the 
diachronic case: In the diachronic case, when I separately consider each offer, I need 
to predict my future choices regarding later offers in order to determine the final 
outcome of my current choice. In the synchronic case, however, when considering an 
offer of a bet, I do not make any predictions about the decisions I take regarding other 
bet offers in the package. As long as each of the other offers still is under deliberation, 
I cannot – it seems – relate to them in a predictive mode. At least on one interpretation 
of Levi’s thesis that deliberation crowds out prediction, this is, I guess, what he would 
want to say.
19
 But then disunification in the synchronic case involves more than just 
separate decisions on each bet offer. It would also seem to involve some form of 
abstraction from the context: While considering whether to accept a given bet, the 
agent disregards the other bets that are on offer and her decisions on those bets.
20
  
   This difference between disunification in the diachronic and in the synchronic case, 
is important. But, if anything, it makes synchronic arguments less compelling than the 
diachronic ones. The kind of disunification in decision-making that is required for the 
former arguments to work involves putting artificial blinkers on the deliberating 
agent. It is thus a more radical and for that reason more problematic form of disunity 
than the one needed for the latter arguments.
 21
 And, anyway, this difference does not 
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 For his exposition and defence of that thesis, see Levi (1989), (1991), (1997). For a critical 
discussion, see Joyce (2002) and Rabinowicz (2002). 
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 In the diachronic case, an analogue of such radical disunification can be found in myopic choice: A 
myopic agent chooses between current options without taking into account her future action 
opportunities; she approaches her current decision as though it were the only decision she is ever going 
to make. As we have seen, myopia is not a pre-requisite for exploitation in the diachronic cases. 
Foresight alone does not suffice as a safeguard.  
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 An example of how this difference can play a role is provided by a recent discussion of the question 
whether subjective probabilities must be sharp. Elga (2010) constructed a kind of ‘reverse’ diachronic 
Dutch book against an agent with imprecise subjective probabilities. The book consisted of two bets, 
offered in sequence, one on Heads and the other one on Tails in the same throw of the coin, where the 
agent’s probabilities for these events were supposed to be imprecise. Both bets had the same price and 
stake (price: 10, stake: 25), chosen in such a way that the agent who accepted both bets would benefit 
whatever happens (she would pay 10+10 for the two bets, but would win 25 whatever happened). A 
Dutch book of this ‘reverse’ kind is successful if the agent refuses each of the bets in the book, thereby 
forgoing a sure benefit. (Cf. the discussion of the centipede for intransitive preferrers in section 3 
above.) In particular, Elga suggested that his Dutch book would be successful if the agent with 
imprecise probability assignments followed the  rule of maximizating minimal expected utility 
(MmEU). If the agent’s probability for Heads is given by an interval from, say, .2 to .8 (which induces 
the corresponding interval for Tails), the minimal expected utility for each of the two bets is negative 
(0.225 – 10 = -7,5).  
affect the issue of the availability of a dominating option. In both set-ups, the 
dominating option might be available without being an alternative that the agent 
considers in her (disunified) deliberation. If this is the case, then Levi no longer has 
grounds for his claim that synchronic pragmatic arguments have a bite that the 
diachronic arguments lack. 
   In the synchronic set-up, the presence of the option to refuse all the bets in the 
package does not, on the received view, make it irrational for the agent to decide to 
accept any particular bet, when she considers whether to accept it or not. The agent 
views her decision problem in a disunified fashion, in which the option of the 
wholesale refusal does not figure as one of the alternatives. The same should therefore 
apply to the diachronic case. In the diachronic set-up, the mere presence of the option 
to refuse all the offers, the current and the future ones, does not make it irrational for 
the agent to accept any particular offer in the exploitation sequence, when she 
considers whether to accept that offer or to refuse it. For, again, she views her 
decision problem in a disunified fashion, which means that the option of the 
wholesale refusal does not figure as one of the alternatives she considers. 
   In his more recent comments, Levi (2006) addresses this point. Commenting on the 
above suggestion and using my money pump with persistent offers as an example, he 
argues that the disunified form of practical deliberation as such must be irrational if it 
is not inescapable: 
                                                                                                                                            
   As has been shown by Sahlin and Weirich (2013), Elga was mistaken in his diagnosis. The ‘reverse’ 
diachronic Dutch book doesn’t work against the (disunified) MmEU agent, if the latter  makes use of 
backward induction. Then, as is easy to see, she is going to accept each of the bets in the book. More 
precisely, if she won’t accept the first bet, she is not going to accept the second one either, given that its 
minimal expected utility is negative.  But if she will accept the first bet, she is going to accept the 
second one. The reason is that accepting the second bet in addition to the first one will guarantee her a 
sure total gain. Relying on her future rationality, she therefore has a good reason to accept the first bet 
as well. Elga (2012) recognized the validity of this criticism.  
   However, what Elga didn’t point out is that his ‘reverse’ book would still work against a disunified 
MmEU-agent, if it were set up synchronically rather than diachronically. Thus, it would still work if all 
the bets in the book were offered to the agent at the same time rather than sequentially. As each bet is 
unattractive on its own by MmEU lights, it will be rejected in this synchronic set-up unless the agent 
decides on both offers together rather than on each of them separately. (In fact, in their paper, Sahlin 
and Weirich implicitly assume that a rational agent must be synchronically unified and therefore 
dismiss the synchronic construction of Elga’s argument with the following remark: “An agent deciding 
simultaneously about A and about B has the option of accepting both gambles and the option of 
rejecting both gambles because a combination of compatible options at a time is also an option at the 
time. In a synchronic version of Elga’s problem, MmEU prohibits rejecting both gambles because the 
minimum expected utility of accepting both gambles is greater than the minimum expected utility of 
rejecting both gambles.”) 
   A possible way to understand Rabinowicz’s suggestion is that X has control at the initial node 
over which of the eight paths X will choose. [Here, “the eight paths” refers to the eight branches 
in the decision tree for the money pump in question.] But X deliberates in a “disunified” way so 
that at each node he deliberates between the “sell-don’t sell” options available then.  
   If X refuses to consider all the options that are available to X according to X’s beliefs and 
goals, X’s deliberation is irrational. Indeed, this is so whether or not the options that are not 
considered dominate the one chosen from the options that are. Such disunity is to be avoided. 
This is so whether X is offered a set of gambles at the same time or is offered a sequence of 
options where X regards X to be in control of the path X will take. (Levi 2006, p. 376) 
Levi’s point, then, is that any deliberation that ignores some of the options available 
to the agent is ipso facto irrational. Since disunified deliberation has this feature (as it 
ignores the ‘wholesale’ options), it is always irrational. It is irrational whether or not 
the ignored options dominate the chosen ones and whether or not the decision set-up 
is diachronic or synchronic. 
   If Levi is right, pragmatic arguments for various constraints on the agent’s beliefs 
and desires would all seem ill-conceived insofar as they involve exploitation set-ups 
that consist of collections of opportunities. We have seen that such arguments 
presuppose not only that the agent violates the relevant constraints on her beliefs and 
preferences but also that she makes her decisions in a disunified fashion. But then, if 
disunification itself is irrational since it makes the agent ignore some of the available 
options, the arguments lose their bite: They provide no reasons for upholding the 
relevant constraints. Instead, all blame falls on disunification as such.
22
 Note also that, 
if Levi is right in what he now suggests, then synchronic and diachronic arguments 
would again be put on equal footing. They would all be equally worthless. 
   But is Levi right? Is it always irrational to ignore some of the options that are 
available for choice? I very much doubt it. It is one thing to require that the 
considered action alternatives should be jointly exhaustive in the sense that the agent 
is bound to perform (at least) one of them in every possible development. It is quite 
another thing to demand that the agent should consider every available alternative. 
When I deliberate in a disunified fashion whether or not to accept a certain 
opportunity, the alternatives I consider are jointly exhaustive, despite the fact that I 
ignore the more complex options, which concern not only this opportunity but also 
other opportunities as well. This, I imagine, is how things are with all of us, most of 
the time. In practically every choice situation, the alternatives that figure in our 
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 Note that on this proposal unification in decision making does not come out unscathed either. A 
unified agent considers wholesale options, which means that she disregards more limited kinds of 
opportunities (such as accepting or rejecting a particular bet offer), despite the fact that such options 
also are available. This cannot be rational either on Levi’s (2006) view. 
deliberation admit of versions and extensions that we do not reflect upon. However 
detailed our deliberation might be, there always is room for more detail and 
elaboration. Thus, Levi demands too much. 
   We can, to be sure, require that the set of alternatives the agent considers is not too 
meagre – that it obeys some richness conditions. One such condition has already been 
mentioned: The set in question should be jointly exhaustive. Another condition that 
seems reasonable is (weak) closure under dominance: if the agent considers an action 
A, and there are available actions that dominate A, then at least one of such actions 
should belong to the set of alternatives the agent considers. (A strong closure under 
dominance would require the agent to consider all the actions that dominate A, but 
this seems much too strong: there may be indefinitely many such actions.) Now, one 
might think that closure under dominance is violated whenever disunification leads to 
exploitation. This, however, would be a mistake. It is true that the disunified agent in 
our examples does not consider the option to refuse every offer, even though this 
wholesale refusal dominates the option to accept all the offers. However, the latter 
option is not among the ones he considers either. Being disunified, his options are 
piecemeal rather than wholesale: his deliberation is always restricted to the question 
whether to accept a particular offer or to reject it. Since the option to refuse all offers 
does not dominate the option to accept a particular offer, closure under dominance is 
not violated in such cases. 
6. Summing up 
Let me sum up the main claims of this paper. Pragmatic arguments cannot establish 
the inherent rationality of constraints on the agent’s state of mind. Instead, the kind of 
rationality they target is purely instrumental: Their proper role is to identify 
constraints that the agent has reason to comply with in order to safely engage in 
disunified decision-making. In Levi’s apt terminology, it is a matter of ‘tax 
avoidance’: Pragmatic arguments identify constraints one needs to satisfy to be 
shielded against the tax imposed on disunification. I share Levi’s view that avoiding 
tax at all costs is unreasonable, especially if it is a matter of constraints that do not 
seem to be inherently compelling. (The Principle of Reflection is a case in point.) I do 
not share his more recent view that disunification as such is always irrational just 
because it involves ignoring some available options. However, to the extent that (i) 
synchronic unification is much easier and less costly to achieve than its diachronic 
counterpart, and also because (ii) synchronic disunification requires resorting to 
artificial blinkers in deliberation (it requires disregarding one’s decisions concerning 
other bet offers when considering a given bet), diachronic pragmatic arguments 
provide us with stronger instrumental reasons for compliance. Unlike synchronic 
disunification, which appears to be a purely theoretical construct, diachronic 
disunification is a fact of life. This gives special weight to diachronic pragmatic 
arguments which identify constraints that safeguard a diachronically disunified mind. 
There is some irony in this conclusion. If I am right, the classic and most influential 
pragmatic arguments - synchronic Dutch books - are considerably less compelling 
than their younger diachronic cousins. 
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